Linear Equilibria for Dynamic LQG Games with Asymmetric Information and
  Dependent Types by Heydaribeni, Nasimeh & Anastasopoulos, Achilleas
ar
X
iv
:1
90
9.
04
83
4v
1 
 [e
co
n.G
N]
  1
1 S
ep
 20
19
Linear Equilibria for Dynamic LQG Games with Asymmetric
Information and Dependent Types
Nasimeh Heydaribeni and Achilleas Anastasopoulos
Abstract—We consider a non-zero-sum linear quadratic
Gaussian (LQG) dynamic game with asymmetric information.
Each player observes privately a noisy version of a (hidden)
state of the world V , resulting in dependent private obser-
vations. We study perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) for this
game with equilibrium strategies that are linear in players’
private estimates of V . The main difficulty arises from the
fact that players need to construct estimates on other players’
estimate on V , which in turn would imply that an infinite
hierarchy of estimates on estimates needs to be constructed,
rendering the problem unsolvable. We show that this is not
the case: each player’s estimate on other players’ estimates
on V can be summarized into her own estimate on V and
some appropriately defined public information. Based on this
finding we characterize the PBE through a backward/forward
algorithm akin to dynamic programming for the standard
LQG control problem. Unlike the standard LQG problem,
however, Kalman filter covariance matrices, as well as some
other required quantities, are observation-dependent and thus
cannot be evaluated off-line through a forward recursion.
Index Terms—linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) games, per-
fect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), dynamic games, asymmetric
information.
I. INTRODUCTION
Linear Quadratic Gaussian (LQG) models have been stud-
ied extensively for decision and control problems. In the
simplest instance of a single centralized controller it is well
known that there is separation of estimation and control,
posterior beliefs of the state are Gaussian, a sufficient statistic
for control is the state estimate evaluated by the Kalman
filter, the optimal control is linear in the state estimate, and
the required covariance matrices can be calculated offline [1].
The LQG model for the case of multiple controllers with
different information patterns and single objective has also
been studied extensively in the context of dynamic decen-
tralized teams [2]–[4]. Although it is known that, in general,
linear controllers are not optimal in LQG team problems [5],
some information structures have been identified for which
linear controllers are shown to be optimal [3].
In order to capture the strategic behavior of agents, which
is an important aspect of today’s extensive networks [6]–
[8], LQG models have also been considered in the context
of dynamic games. There is extensive literature on dynamic
LQG games with asymmetric information, each work con-
sidering a different information structure, such as delayed
observation sharing [9], [10], or no access to other agents’
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observations [11], to name a few. The appropriate solution
for such problems is some notion of equilibrium such as
Markov perfect equilibrium, Bayesian Nash equilibrium,
perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), sequential equilibrium,
etc. [12]–[15]. In dynamic games, due to the complexity
of finding equilibrium strategies with increasing domains,
researchers consider summaries of the agents’ histories into
time-invariant objects and define structured equilibria. For
LQG models in particular, linear structured equilibria have
been considered [16]–[19].
A broad classification of the relevant literature can be
based on whether there is symmetric or asymmetric infor-
mation among agents, whether a two-stage or a multi-stage
game is considered, and whether the equilibrium concept
used guarantees “perfection”, i.e., sequential rationality at
every possible (or impossible) information pattern. Authors
in [20] have considered a multi-stage game with a special
information structure enabling them to characterize a non-
signaling Markov perfect equilibrium, which is a solution
concept for symmetric information patterns. In [18], authors
have considered a multi-stage game and characterized a
signaling equilibrium which is linear in agents’ private ob-
servations. In addition, a backward sequential decomposition
was presented for the construction of the equilibrium, based
on the general development in [21], [22]. A number of works
consider LQG games where information available to some
players is affected by the decision of others. The works
of [23] on strategic information transmission, and [17] on
Gaussian cheap talk consider two-stage games and focus on
Bayesian Nash equilibria. The classic work on Bayesian per-
suasion [24], and the related one on strategic deception [19]
consider two-stage and multi-stage games, respectively, and
focus on (sender preferred) subgame perfect equilibria owing
to the fact that strategies of the sender are observed.
In this paper, we study a dynamic LQG non-zero-sum
game with asymmetric information. We consider a model
with an unknown Gaussian state of the world V , where each
player i has a private noisy observation X it of it at each
time t. The private observations of players are conditionally
independent given V . Our model closely follows that of [18]
with one important difference: the private observations of
players in [18] are independent where in our case, they are
dependent through V ; in particular they are conditionally
independent given V . This model can also be thought of
as a generalization of the one in [25] where V models the
value of a product (or a technology) and agents receive a
noisy private signal about it and decide whether to adopt it
or not, with the important difference that we allow multiple
agents to act simultaneously and, unlike [25], we also allow
them to return to the marketplace at each time instance.
We hypothesize (and eventually prove) structured PBE with
strategies for user i being linear in Vˆ it , the private estimate
of V by user i, generated by a (private) Kalman filter.
What makes the considered model interesting and more
challenging compared to previous works is that we need to
deal with private beliefs while in most of the existing models,
the beliefs are either public (e.g., [16], [18], [22]), or there is
a public belief that can be easily augmented by the players’
private signals to form the private beliefs (e.g., [25]–[27]), or
even there are no beliefs to be defined due to the equilibrium
concept used [17], [19], [23], [24].
In order to intuitively explain the conceptual difficulty
arising from the above dependent-signal model, consider the
following thought process. If a player acts according to her
private estimate Vˆ it of the hidden variable V and she expects
other players to behave in the same way, she needs to form
a belief over other players’ beliefs to interpret and predict
their actions and she has to take that belief into account
when acting. In other words, she has to form a belief over
(at least) Vˆ
j
t for all other users j 6= i. This is also a form of
a belief on beliefs which is also a private information of user
i and it has to be taken into account in her strategies, and
one may expect that in the simplest case this will reduce
to user i’s estimates V˜
i,j
t of Vˆ
j
t . Due to symmetry of the
information structure, all other players should do the same.
But now, it is clear that user i needs to form beliefs over
beliefs over beliefs of other players. In the simplest case
this would involve user i’s private estimates V˜
i,j,k
t of the
estimates V˜
j,k
t . This chain continues as long as this hierarchy
of beliefs are private. It stops whenever the beliefs in one step
are public or public functions of previous step beliefs. One of
the main contributions of this paper is to show that, due to the
conditional independence of the private signals given V , this
chain stops at the second step and players estimations over
the estimations of others, V˜
i,j
t , are public linear functions of
their own estimations (the first step beliefs), Vˆ it .
Once the above task is accomplished, we show that the
equilibrium strategies can be characterized by an appropriate
backward sequential decomposition algorithm akin to dy-
namic programming. The main difference from the standard
stochastic control LQG framework is that the forward recur-
sion that evaluates covariance matrices cannot be performed
separately as it depends on the equilibrium strategies. This
was also the case in [18]. A unique feature of this work is
the requirement to update in a forward manner additional
quantities that are observation dependent (public actions).
This precludes off-line evaluation of these forward-updated
quantities and necessitates their inclusion as part of the state
of the above mentioned backward sequential decomposition.
This is the second main contribution of this work.
The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows.
In Section II, the model is described. Section III is a review
over the solution concept that we have considered in this
paper. We have developed our main results in Section IV.
Section V summarizes the arguments in Section IV into two
algorithms and we conclude in Section VI.
A. Notation
We use upper case letters for scalar and vector ran-
dom variables and lower case letters for their realizations.
Bold upper case letters are used to denote matrices. Sub-
scripts denote time indices and superscripts represent player
identities. The notation −i denotes the set of all players
except i. All vectors are column vectors. The transpose
of a matrix A (or vector) is denoted by A′. We use
semicolons “; ” for vertical concatenation of matrices (or
vectors). For any vector (or matrix) with time and player
indices, ait (or A
i
t), a
−i
t denotes the vertical concatenation
of vectors (or matrices) a1t , a
2
t , . . . , a
i−1
t , a
i+1
t , . . .. Further,
ai1:t means (a
i
1, a
i
2, . . . , a
i
t). In general, for any vector with
time and player indices, ait, we remove the superscript to
show the vertical concatenation of the whole vectors and
we remove the subscript to show the set of all vectors
for all times. The notations 0 is used to show the matrix
of all zeros with appropriate dimension and I denotes the
identity matrix of appropriate dimension. For two matrices
A and B, D(A,B) represents the block diagonal con-
catenation of these matrices, i.e.,
[
A 0
0 B
]
(it applies
for any number of matrices). By D(A−i), we mean the
block diagonal concatenation of matrices Aj for j ∈ −i.
Further, quad(A;B) represents B′AB. For the equation[
a˜ ; b˜ ; c˜
]
= A
[
a ; b ; c
]
, the notation (A)a˜,b
denotes the submatrix of A corresponding to rows a˜ and
columns b. We use “ : ” for either of the row or column
subscripts to indicate the whole rows or columns. We use
δ(·) for the Dirac delta function. For any Euclidean set S,
∆(S) represents the space of all probability measures on S.
II. MODEL
We consider a discrete time dynamic system with N =
{1, 2, ..., N} strategic players over a finite time horizon T =
{1, 2, ..., T }. There is a static unknown state of the world
V ∼ N(0,Σ) with size Nv . Each player has a private noisy
observation X it of V at every time step t ∈ T
xit = v + w
i
t, (1)
where W it ∼ N(0,Q
i) and all of the noise random vectors
W it are independent across i and t and also of V . The values
of Σ and Qi, ∀i ∈ N are common knowledge between
players. Also, we assume that players have perfect recall.
At time t, player i takes action ait ∈ A = R
Na which is
observed publicly by all players. We can construct the history
of the system as ht = (v, x1:t, a1:t−1) ∈ Ht and the history
observed by player i as hit = (x
i
1:t, a1:t−1) ∈ H
i
t. At the end
of time step t, each player i receives the reward Ri(v, at),
Ri(v, at) =
[
v′ a′t
]
Bi
[
v
at
]
= quad(Bi;
[
v
at
]
), (2)
where Bi is a symmetric matrix of appropriate dimensions.
We assume that the rewards are not observed by the players
until the end of the time horizon.
Let gi = (git)t∈T be a probabilistic strategy of player
i, where git : H
i
t → ∆(A) such that player i’s action is
generated according to the distribution git(·|h
i
t). The strategy
profile of all players is denoted by g. For the strategy profile
g, player i’s total expected reward is
J i,g := Eg
{
T∑
t=1
Ri(V,At)
}
, (3)
and her objective is to maximize her total expected reward.
III. SOLUTION CONCEPT
We can model this system as a dynamic game with
asymmetric information and an appropriate solution concept
for such games is the perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE).
A PBE consists of a pair (β, µ) (an assessment) of strategy
profile β = (βit)t∈T ,i∈N and belief system µ = (µ
i
t)t∈T ,i∈N
where µit : H
i
t → ∆(Ht) satisfies Bayesian updating
1
and sequential rationality holds. For any i ∈ N , t ∈
T , hit ∈ H
i
t, β˜
i, sequential rationality imposes the following
condition:
E
βiβ−i
µ
{
T∑
n=t
Ri(V,An)|h
i
t
}
≥ Eβ˜
iβ−i
µ
{
T∑
n=t
Ri(V,An)|h
i
t
}
(4)
IV. STRUCTURED PBE
The strategies git(·|h
i
t) have a domain that is expanding
in time. Finding such strategies is complicated with the
complexity growing exponentially with the time horizon. For
this reason, we consider summaries for hit ∈ H
i
t, i.e., S(h
i
t),
that are not expanding in time. We are interested in PBEs
with strategies, git(·|h
i
t) = ψ
i
t(·|S(h
i
t)), that are functions of
hit only through the summaries S(h
i
t). These PBEs are called
structured PBEs [22]. In contrast to Hit, the set of summaries
does not grow in time and therefore, finding such structured
PBEs is less complicated than a general PBE. According
to [22], we can show that players can guarantee the same
rewards by playing structured strategies compared to the
general non-structured ones. In the dynamic games with
asymmetric information, the summaries are usually the belief
of players over the unknown variables of the game. In this
model, we will show that these beliefs are Gaussian and since
any Gaussian belief can be expressed in terms of its mean
and covariance matrix, we define the summaries such that
they include the mean and covariance matrices of the beliefs
of the players over V . The mean of each player’s belief,
i.e., her estimation over V , will be her private information.
The covariance matrix, however, can be calculated publicly.
Each player, in addition to her own estimate of V , needs to
interpret actions of others and predict their future actions.
Hence, each player needs to have a belief over the estimates
of other players on V . We will show that this latter belief is
also Gaussian and therefore, one needs to keep track of only
1Bayesian updating includes both on and off equilibrium histories. This
condition requires the beliefs to be Bayesian updated given any history,
whether that history is on equilibrium or off equilibrium [15].
its mean and covariance. Therefore, for all i ∈ N , t ∈ T ,
we define the following quantities,
vˆit = E[V |h
i
t] = E[V |x
i
1:t, a1:t−1] (5)
v˜
i,j
t = E[Vˆ
j
t |h
i
t] = E[Vˆ
j
t |x
i
1:t, a1:t−1]. (6)
The quantity vˆit is player i’s best estimate of V given her
observations up to time t. As mentioned before, this quantity
is a private estimation for player i and is not measurable with
respect to the sigma algebra generated by the observations of
any other player j. Hence, player i should form an estimation
over the private estimations of other players and this is why
v˜
i,j
t is defined. This in turn implies that players’ strategies
should also be a function of their estimations over others’
estimations. Hence, the same argument holds about the need
to define an estimation over estimations of players over other
players’ estimations. This argument continues as long as
these estimations are private. This chain stops whenever one
of the estimations of players is public (or a public function
of previous-step private estimations) and therefore, there is
no need to form an estimation over it.
Indeed, we will show that v˜
i,−i
t is a linear function of vˆ
i
t,
hence, there is no need to include v˜
i,−i
t in the summary
S(hit) and therefore, no other player needs to form an
estimation over it. The summary we use for hit is defined
as S(hit) = (vˆ
i
t, P (h
i
t)), where P (h
i
t) is the public summary
for hit and it includes the covariance matrix of player i’s
belief over V and some other needed quantities that will
be subsequently defined. We are interested in the strategies
Ait ∼ ψ
i
t(·|vˆ
i
t , P (h
i
t)) = γ
i
t(·|vˆ
i
t), where γ
i
t = θ
i
t(P (h
i
t)).
In particular, we want to prove that the linear strategies
γit(a
i
t|vˆ
i
t) = δ(a
i
t−L
i
tvˆ
i
t−m
i
t), where L
i
t andm
i
t are a matrix
and a vector with appropriate dimensions and are functions
of P (hit), form a PBE of the game.
A. State Evolution
In order to prove Gaussianity of the beliefs over V and
other players’ estimations, for each player i, we define a state
vector that includes v and all of the players’ estimations in
addition to her private observation. We will use Kalman filter
results to update this vector recursively in time and prove
Gaussianity and other properties for it. We define the state
vector as sit =
[
v ; vˆit−1 ; vˆ
−i
t−1 ; x
i
t
]
, for each player
i ∈ N . By deriving the conditional distribution of the state
vector Sit given the observation of player i, we can form her
belief over V and other players’ estimations Vˆ −it−1.
In the next theorem, we show that for γ
j
k(a
j
k|vˆ
j
k) = δ(a
j
k−
L
j
kvˆ
j
k −m
j
k), ∀k ≤ t − 1, j ∈ N , v˜
i,j
t is a linear function
of vˆit. Further, the state s
i
t is updated recursively in terms of
sit−1 through a Gauss-Markov model.
Theorem 1: For γ
j
k(a
j
k|vˆ
j
t ) = δ(a
j
k − L
j
kvˆ
j
k −m
j
k), ∀k ≤
t− 1, j ∈ N ,
(a) The random vector sit =
[
v ; vˆit−1 ; vˆ
−i
t−1 ; x
i
t
]
evolves according to a linear Gaussian process,


v
vˆit
vˆ−it
xit+1

 = Ait


v
vˆit−1
vˆ−it−1
xit

+Hit
[
w−it
wit+1
]
+ dit, (7)
where
Ait =


I 0 0 0
G
i,i
t
G
i,−i
t
I 0 0 0

 (8)
and G
i,i
t , G
i,−i
t , H
i
t and d
i
t are matrices and vector with
appropriate dimensions (they will be constructed in the
proof).
(b) The conditional expectation E[Vˆ −it |v, a
−i
1:t−1] is a linear
function of v,
E[Vˆ −it |v, a
−i
1:t−1] = E
i
tv + f
i
t , (9)
and Eit, and f
i
t are a matrix and a vector, respectively,
with appropriate dimensions (they will be constructed in the
proof).
Before proving this Theorem we note that part (b) of
Theorem 1 implies that the estimation of player i over private
estimations of players −i, i.e, v˜i,−it , is a linear function of
vˆit,
v˜
i,−i
t = E
i
tvˆ
i
t + f
i
t . (10)
Proof: Equation (7) is obvious for the first and fourth
part of the state (v and xit+1) by setting (H
i
t)xit+1,: =[
0 I
]
, (Hit)v,: = 0 and (d
i
t)vxit+1 = 0. We prove all
other parts of Theorem 1 together through induction.
• Induction basis: for t = 1, we have si1 =[
v ; vˆi0 ; vˆ
−i
0 ; x
i
1
]
=
[
v ; 0 ; 0 ; xi1
]
and for
t = 2, si2 =
[
v ; vˆi1 ; vˆ
−i
1 ; x
i
2
]
. The definition of vˆi1
and the fact that the vectors v and xi1 are jointly Gaussian
results in the following [1, Ch.7],
vˆi1 = E[V |x
i
1] = E[V ] + E[V X
i′
1 ]E[X
i
1X
i′
1 ]
−1
(xi1 − E[X
i
1])
= Σ(Σ+Qi)
−1
xi1 = Σ(Σ+Q
i)
−1
(v + wi1).
(11)
We can also write
vˆ
j
1 = Σ(Σ+Q
j)
−1
(v + wj1), ∀j ∈ N . (12)
Therefore, we can derive Ai1 (and essentially matrices
G
i,i
1 , G
i,−i
1 ), H
i
1 and d
i
1
Ai1 =


I 0 0 0
0 0 0 Σ(Σ+Qi)
−1
Σ(Σ+Q−i)
−1
0 0 0
I 0 0 0

 (13)
⇒ Gi,i1 =
[
0 0 0 Σ(Σ+Qi)
−1
]
(14)
G
i,−i
1 =
[
Σ(Σ+Q−i)
−1
0 0 0
]
(15)
Hi1 =


0 0
0 0
D(Σ(Σ+Q−i)
−1
) 0
0 I

 (16)
di1 = 0, (17)
where Σ(Σ+Q−i)
−1
is the vertical concatenation of the
matrices Σ(Σ+Qj)
−1
for j ∈ −i. Further, we can derive
the estimation of player i over other players’ estimations as
follows,
v˜
i,j
1 = E[Vˆ
j
1 |x
i
1] = E[Σ(Σ+Q
j)
−1
(V +W j1 )|x
i
1]
= Σ(Σ+Qj)
−1
EV [E[V +W
j
1 |x
i
1, V ]|x
i
1]
= Σ(Σ+Qj)
−1
E[V |xi1] = Σ(Σ+Q
j)
−1
vˆi1,
(18)
which means that
Ei1 = Σ(Σ+Q
−i)
−1
f i1 = 0.
(19)
This concludes the proof of part (a) and (b) of the theorem
for t = 1.
• Induction hypothesis: (7) and (9) hold for t = k − 1 and
k ≥ 2.
• Induction step: we first show one important result from the
induction hypothesis for part (b) of the theorem. Notice that
due to conditional independence of x
j
k−1’s given v across
time and players, and since vˆ
j
k−1 is a function of x
j
1:k−1 and
a1:k−2, and since a
i
1:k−2 is a function of x
i
1:k−2 and a
−i
1:k−3,
we have
v˜
i,j
k−1 = E[Vˆ
j
k−1|x
i
1:k−1, a1:k−2]
= EV [E[Vˆ
j
k−1|V, x
i
1:k−1, a1:k−2]|x
i
1:k−1, a1:k−2]
= EV [E[Vˆ
j
k−1|V, a
−i
1:k−2]|x
i
1:k−1, a1:k−2]
= EV [E
i
k−1V + f
i
k−1|x
i
1:k−1, a1:k−2]
= Eik−1E[V |x
i
1:k−1, a1:k−2] + f
i
k−1
= Eik−1vˆ
i
k−1 + f
i
k−1.
(20)
In order to prove the results for t = k, by using the induction
hypothesis, we form a linear Gaussian model with partial
observations and use Kalman filter results [1, Ch.7]. Consider
the following stochastic system with state sik, state evolution
given by (7) (for t = k − 1)
sik = A
i
k−1s
i
k−1 +H
i
k−1
[
w−ik−1
wik
]
+ dik−1, (21a)
and observation given by
yik =

 aik−1 −mik−1a−ik−1 −m−ik−1
xik

 = Ciksik, (21b)
where
Cik =

 0 Lik−1 0 00 0 D(L−ik−1) 0
0 0 0 I

 . (21c)
Note that yi1:k is a shifted version of h
i
k. We denote
E[Sik|y
i
1:k] and E[S
i
k|y
i
1:k−1] by s
i
k|k and s
i
k|k−1, respectively.
By using standard Kalman filter results [1, Ch.7], we have
sik|k = E[S
i
k|x
i
1:k, a1:k−1] =


vˆik
vˆik−1
E[Vˆ −ik−1|x
i
1:k, a1:k−1]
xik


= Aik−1s
i
k−1|k−1 + J
i
k(y
i
k −C
i
ks
i
k|k−1) + d
i
k−1
⇒ vˆik = vˆ
i
k−1 + (J
i
k)vˆik,:(y
i
k −C
i
ks
i
k|k−1)
= vˆik−1 + (J
i
k)vˆik,:

 aik−1 −mik−1 − Lik−1vˆik−1a−ik−1 −m−ik−1 −D(L−ik−1)v˜i,−ik−1
xik − E[X
i
k|x
i
1:k−1, a1:k−2]

,
(22)
where
Jik = Σ
i
k|k−1C
i′
k (C
i
kΣ
i
k|k−1C
i′
k )
−1, (23)
Σik|k−1 = A
i
k−1Σ
i
k−1A
i′
k−1 +H
i
k−1D(Q
−i,Qi)Hi
′
k−1,
(24)
and Σik is the covariance matrix of S
i
k conditioned on h
i
k
and according to [1, Ch.7], it is derived from the following
recursive update equation
Σik+1=(I− J
i
k+1C
i
k+1)(A
i
kΣ
i
kA
i′
k+H
i
kD(Q
−i,Qi)Hi
′
k )
Σi1 = E[S
i
1S
i′
1 ]− E[S
i
1X
i′
1 ](E[X
i
1X
i′
1 ])
−1
E[Si1X
i′
1 ]
′
=


Σ 0 0 Σ
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Σ 0 0 Σ+Qi


−


Σ
0
0
Σ+Qi

(Σ+Qi)−1[Σ′ 0 0 (Σ+Qi)′ ] .
(25)
Notice that unlike vˆit, which is private information of player
i, the matrix Σit is a public quantity due to the independence
of equation (25) to the private observations of player i.
Since we can write
E[X ik|x
i
1:k−1, a1:k−2] = E[V +W
i
k|x
i
1:k−1, a1:k−2]
= E[V |xi1:k−1, a1:k−2] = vˆ
i
k−1,
(26)
and according to (20),
vˆik = vˆ
i
k−1 + (J
i
k)vˆik,:

 0−D(L−ik−1)Eik−1vˆik−1
xik − vˆ
i
k−1


+ (Jik)vˆi
k
,a
−i
k−1
(a−ik−1 −m
−i
k−1 −D(L
−i
k−1)f
i
k−1)
= Gi,ik


v
vˆik−1
vˆ−ik−1
xik

+ (dik)vˆik ,
(27)
where
(Gi,ik ):,vvˆ−i
k−1
= 0
(Gi,ik ):,xik = (J
i
k)vˆi
k
,xi
k
(Gi,ik ):,vˆik−1= I−(J
i
k)vˆi
k
,a
−i
k−1
D(L−ik−1)E
i
k−1−(J
i
k)vˆi
k
,xi
k
(dik)vˆi
k
= (Jik)vˆi
k
,a
−i
k−1
(a−ik−1 −m
−i
k−1 −D(L
−i
k−1)f
i
k−1)
(Hik)vˆi
k
,: = 0.
(28)
By considering the dynamic system (21) for each of the
players −i, we can write (27) for players −i. Since x−ik
is not part of sik, we can substitute it by v+w
−i
k and derive
G
i,j
k and (H
i
k)vˆj
k
,: for all j ∈ −i as follows,
(Gi,jk ):,v = (J
j
k)vˆj
k
,x
j
k
(Gi,jk ):,vˆ−j
k−1
xi
k
= 0
(Gi,jk ):,vˆj
k−1
= I−(Jjk)vˆj
k
,a
−j
k−1
D(L−jk−1)E
j
k−1−(J
j
k)vˆj
k
,x
j
k
(dik)vˆj
k
= (Jjk)vˆj
k
,a
−j
k−1
(a−jk−1 −m
−j
k−1 −D(L
−j
k−1)f
j
k−1)
(Hik)vˆ−i
k
,: =
[
D((J−ik )vˆ−i
k
,x
−i
k
) 0
]
.
(29)
Therefore, we have derived the matrices Aik, H
i
k and d
i
k and
so (7) holds for t = k.
Next, we prove (9) for t = k. We use the fact that obser-
vations of players are independent conditioned on V and
consider a conditional linear Gaussian model. Note that the
inner expectation in (20) is publicly measurable conditioned
on V . We use this fact to form a conditional model, where
the observations are the conditions in the inner expectation
in (20), and we derive conditional Kalman filters. Consider
the following linear Gaussian model for t = k, with
state
s˜ik =
[
v
vˆ−ik−1
]
,
state evolution
s˜ik+1 = A˜
i
ks˜
i
k + H˜
i
kw
−i
k + d˜
i
k,
and observation
y˜ik =
[
v
a−ik−1 −m
−i
k−1
]
= C˜iks
i
k,
(30)
where
A˜ik =
[
I 0
G˜
i,−i
k
]
(31)
G˜
i,−i
k = (G
i,−i
k ):,vvˆ−i
k−1
(32)
C˜ik =
[
I 0
0 D(L−ik−1)
]
(33)
H˜ik = (H
i
k)vvˆ−i
k
,w
−i
k
(34)
d˜ik = (d
i
k)vvˆ−i
k
. (35)
By using Kalman filter results and the induction hypothesis
we can write
s˜ik+1|k = E[S˜
i
k+1|y˜
i
1:k] = E[S˜
i
k+1|v, a
−i
1:k−1]
= A˜iks˜
i
k|k−1 + A˜
i
kJ˜
i
k(y˜
i
k − C˜
i
ks˜
i
k|k−1) + d˜
i
k
⇒ E[Vˆ −ik |v, a
−i
1:k−1] = (G
i,−i
k ):,vv
+ (Gi,−ik ):,vˆ−i
k−1
E[Vˆ −ik−1|v, a
−i
1:k−2]
− (A˜ikJ˜
i
k)vˆ−i
k
,a
−i
k−1
D(L−ik−1)E[Vˆ
−i
k−1|v, a
−i
1:k−2]
+ (A˜ikJ˜
i
k)vˆ−i
k
,a
−i
k−1
(a−ik−1 −m
−i
k−1) + (d
i
k)vˆ−i
k
= (Gi,−ik ):,vv + (G
i,−i
k ):,vˆ−i
k−1
(Eik−1v + f
i
k−1)
− (A˜ikJ˜
i
k)vˆ−i
k
,a
−i
k−1
D(L−ik−1)(E
i
k−1v + f
i
k−1)
+ (A˜ikJ˜
i
k)vˆ−i
k
,a−i
k−1
(a−ik−1 −m
−i
k−1) + (d
i
k)vˆ−i
k
= Eikv + f
i
k,
(36)
where
Eik = (G
i,−i
k ):,v + (G
i,−i
k ):,vˆ−i
k−1
Eik−1
+ (A˜ikJ˜
i
k)vˆ−i
k
,a
−i
k−1
D(L−ik−1)E
i
k−1,
f ik = ((G
i,−i
k ):,vˆ−i
k−1
− (A˜ikJ˜
i
k)vˆ−i
k
,a
−i
k−1
D(L−ik−1))f
i
k−1
+ (A˜ikJ˜
i
k)vˆ−i
k
,a
−i
k−1
(a−ik−1 −m
−i
k−1) + (d
i
k)vˆ−i
k
,
(37)
and
J˜ik = Σ˜
i
k|k−1C˜
i′
k (C˜
i
kΣ˜
i
k|k−1C˜
i′
k )
−1, (38)
Σ˜ik|k−1 = A˜
i
k−1Σ˜
i
k−1A˜
i′
k−1 + H˜
i
k−1D(Q
−i)H˜i
′
k−1, (39)
and Σ˜ik is the covariance matrix of S˜
i
k conditioned on y˜
i
1:k
and is derived from the following recursive update equation
Σ˜ik+1=(I− J˜
i
k+1C˜
i
k+1)(A˜
i
kΣ˜
i
kA˜
i′
k+H˜
i
kD(Q
−i)H˜i
′
k )
Σ˜i1 = E[S˜
i
1S˜
i′
1 ]− E[S˜
i
1V
′](E[V V ′])−1E[S˜i1V
′]′
=
[
Σ 0
0 0
]
−
[
Σ
0
]
Σ−1
[
Σ′ 0
]
.
(40)
By using Theorem 1, one can form the summary S(hit)
for the specific (linear) strategies of all players as mentioned
in the theorem. This will enable us to form an LQG model
for player i and prove the optimality of linear strategy for
her, given others play linear strategies.
B. Linear Quadratic Gaussian (LQG) model from player i’s
perspective
Part (a) of Theorem 1 implies that Sit is a jointly Gaussian
random vector conditioned on player i’s observation till time
t, ∀i ∈ N , t ∈ T . This implies that the beliefs over V are
jointly Gaussian and so players need only keep track of their
belief’s mean (estimation) and covariance matrices. Further-
more, this theorem implies that a player’s belief over other
players beliefs is also Gaussian and hence, players need to
keep track of their estimation on other players’ estimations,
i.e., v˜. The important point of Theorem 1 is the statement
that the estimation of players on others’ estimations is a
linear function of their own estimation and hence, in order to
keep track of the estimation over other players’ estimations,
a player only needs to keep track of her own estimation over
V . Therefore, vˆit is a sufficient statistic for player i’s private
observations till time t.
On the other hand, in the proof of Theorem 1, there are
three quantities, Σit, E
i
t and f
i
t , that are updated recursively
as a function of previous strategies and actions. This means
they can not be calculated off-line like the covariance matrix
in the classic LQG stochastic control problem [1, Ch.7]. A
way to resolve this issue is to consider them as the public
summary of hit, i.e., P (h
i
t), thus leading to strategies of
the form ψit(·|vˆ
i
t,Σ
i
t,E
i
t, f
i
t ) = γ
i
t(·|vˆ
i
t). In particular, we
will now show that linear strategies of the form γit(·|vˆ
i
t) =
δ(ait − L
i
tvˆ
i
t − m
i
t) are PBE of the game by showing that
if every player j ∈ −i is playing according to (γ−ik )k≤t
and player i is playing according to (γik)k≤t−1, then player
i faces a standard LQG control model from t onwards. By
using the results from [1, Ch.7], we can conclude that player
i’s optimal strategy is linear in vˆit. This is summarized in the
following theorem.
Theorem 2: For any t ∈ T , if all players −i play accord-
ing to the strategy γ−it (a
−i
t |vˆ
−i
t ) = δ(a
−i
t − D(L
−i
t )vˆ
−i
t −
m−it ) and for k < t, the strategies of players are linear in
vˆk, player i faces an MDP with state (vˆ
i
t,Σ
i
t,E
i
t, f
i
t ). The
reward-to-go functions are updated backwards according to
J it (vˆ
i
t,Σ
i
t,E
i
t, f
i
t ) = max
γ˜it(·|vˆ
i
t)
E
γ
−i
t ,γ˜
i
t(·|vˆ
i
t)[Ri(V,At)
+ J it+1(Vˆ
i
t+1,Σ
i
t+1,E
i
t+1, f
i
t+1)|vˆ
i
t,Σ
i
t,E
i
t, f
i
t ]
(41)
and
γit(·|vˆ
i
t) = arg max
γ˜it(·|vˆ
i
t)
E
γ−it ,γ˜
i
t(·|vˆ
i
t)[Ri(V,At)
+ J it+1(Vˆ
i
t+1,Σ
i
t+1,E
i
t+1, f
i
t+1)|vˆ
i
t ,Σ
i
t,E
i
t, f
i
t ],
(42)
where Vˆ it+1,Σ
i
t+1,E
i
t+1, f
i
t+1 are generated from
Vˆ it ,Σ
i
t,E
i
t, f
i
t using γt.
Further, it is optimal for player i to play according to
γit(·|vˆ
i
t) = δ(a
i
t − L
i
tvˆ
i
t −m
i
t).
Proof: By using the results from Theorem 1, given the
strategy profile γt, (vˆ
i
t,Σ
i
t,E
i
t, f
i
t ) forms a Markov chain.
Notice that Vˆ it+1,Σ
i
t+1,E
i
t+1, f
i
t+1 are updated by γt which
is linear and therefore, all results from Theorem 1 hold.
Further, the expected reward E[Ri(V,At)|vˆit,Σ
i
t,E
i
t, f
i
t ] can
be written as quad(B˜it; vˆ
i
t) + ρ
i
t [18] for some appropriately
defined matrix B˜it and function ρ
i
t. Hence, the expected
reward is measurable with respect to (vˆit, P (h
i
t)). We con-
clude that player i faces an MDP. Further, since at each
time t ∈ T , player i faces and MDP with quadratic reward
with respect to vˆit, she faces an LQG. We refer to [1, Ch.7]
to conclude that it is optimal for her to play according to
γit(·|vˆ
i
t) = δ(a
i
t−L
i
tvˆ
i
t−m
i
t), where L
i
t and m
i
t are functions
of the public summary, Σit,E
i
t, f
i
t , and quantities L
−i
t and
m−it .
V. CONSTRUCTING STRUCTURED PBE
The construction of the mentioned structured PBE is
summarized in the following backward/forward sequential
decomposition algorithm.
A. Backward Programming
For every i ∈ N ,
• Set t = T + 1.
• For every (vˆit,Σ
i
t,E
i
t, f
i
t ), set J
i
t (vˆ
i
t,Σ
i
t,Et, ft) = 0.
• Set t = t− 1.
• For every (vˆit,Σ
i
t,E
i
t, f
i
t ), set the value of
J it (vˆ
i
t,Σ
i
t,E
i
t, f
i
t ) and γ
i
t(·|vˆ
i
t) according to (41) and
(42). Set ψit(·|vˆ
i
t,Σ
i
t,E
i
t, f
i
t ) = γ
i
t(·|vˆ
i
t).
• If t > 1, go to step 3, otherwise stop.
B. Forward Programming
For every i ∈ N ,
• Set t = 1.
• According to xit, set vˆ
i
t, Σ
i
t, E
i
t and f
i
t according to (11),
(25) and (19), respectively.
• Set γit(·|vˆ
i
t) = ψ
i
t(·|vˆ
i
t,Σ
i
t,E
i
t, f
i
t ).
• Set t = t+ 1.
• Update vˆit, Σ
i
t, E
i
t, f
i
t according to (27), (25), (37).
• If t < T , go to step 3, otherwise, stop.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied a dynamic LQG game with
asymmetric information and dependent types. We considered
linear strategies for players and by using conditional inde-
pendence of types and Kalman filter results, we proved that
beliefs of players are Gaussian. Furthermore, each player’s
estimate over other players’ estimates are public functions
of her own estimates. This fact enabled us to construct a
summary of players’ histories at each time and develop an
LQG model from the perspective of each player. We thus
characterized PBE with linear strategies through a sequential
backward/forward algorithm.
Future work for this model includes investigation of con-
ditions under which we can have steady state equilibria.
In addition, we are planning to investigate conditions on
the problem primitives under which the described sequential
decomposition algorithm is guaranteed to have solutions.
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